18 September 2026

The New Fault Line Ahead of COP31

The US views carbon as a burden to be lifted from the economy; Europe is turning it into a new entry condition for competition. The world is splitting into two separate economic orders based on the price of carbon. The US seat may remain empty at COP31, but its policy of cheapening carbon will sit at the centre of the table.

Key takeaways

  • The global economy is fracturing into two distinct orders defined by differing approaches to carbon pricing and regulation.
  • Europe is increasingly integrating carbon costs into its trade policies to establish new competitive standards.
  • Despite potential absence, US policies focused on lowering carbon costs will significantly influence COP31 negotiations.
  • The tension between viewing carbon as a cost to be cut versus a regulatory tool creates a new fault line in climate diplomacy.

The United States treats carbon as a burden to be lifted off the economy. Europe is turning it into a new entry condition for competition. The gap opening across the Atlantic says more than climate policy alone: the world is splitting into two economic orders around the price of carbon. The American seat at COP31 may stay empty, but the policy of making carbon cheap will sit at the centre of the table.

Within two days, two opposite decisions were taken on either side of the Atlantic. The US Environmental Protection Agency repealed the Biden-era greenhouse gas limits on coal and gas power plants — rules designed to avoid roughly a billion tonnes of emissions by 2047. For the Trump administration these were needless burdens that slowed energy production and raised corporate costs.

At almost the same moment the European Parliament moved the other way. Members backed extending the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to new products and removing the "emergency brake" that would have allowed the rules to be suspended under certain conditions. Downstream goods with carbon-intensive inputs — from washing machines to car parts — are now in scope of the debate.

On one side the cost of carbon is being removed. On the other it is becoming the condition for crossing the border. This is not merely a difference between American and European climate policy; it is the hardening of two distinct economic models.

Two definitions of competitiveness

The Trump administration's logic is explicit: the more abundant and cheap the energy, the more competitive the economy. Environmental rules are obstacles to production, so the cost of carbon must fall, fossil fuels must be unblocked, and industry must be unburdened.

Europe's logic is the inverse: if producing without emitting has a cost, European firms should not be the only ones paying it. Foreign producers selling into the European market must also carry the price of the carbon embedded in their goods.

The US seeks competitive advantage by escaping the cost of carbon; Europe seeks it by globalising that cost. One protects its industry by removing rules, the other by carrying its rules to the border. Read this way, CBAM is not only a climate instrument. It is a trade filter applied through the price of carbon — an industrial policy defended at the frontier.

Same carbon, different price

For the atmosphere, a tonne from an American plant is identical to a tonne from a European one. For the economy, the two are now radically different.

In the US, carbon is increasingly a cost whose price is being erased. In Europe it is becoming a line item inside the product's cost, its financing and its market access. The same good is therefore subject to two economic realities depending on where it is made and where it is sold.

Steel, machinery or a car part produced under looser American rules may gain a short-term cost advantage. Yet on entering the European market, the carbon price unpaid at the factory can reappear at the border. The cost of carbon does not disappear; only the point of collection moves. Washington takes it off the power plant's balance sheet, Brussels rewrites it on the importer's invoice.

The ground beneath COP31

This divergence changes the ground on which COP31 will stand in Antalya, 9–20 November.

Türkiye is positioning COP31 as an "implementation COP": less about announcing new targets, more about converting existing pledges into investment, finance and concrete projects. The Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE) takes its name from that claim — a bridge between climate targets and finance.

But another difficulty now sits in front of the presidency. The widening gap between countries' economic rules has to be managed too. One of the world's largest economies is stripping carbon limits from its power sector while one of the world's largest trading blocs is embedding the carbon price into ever more products.

So how do economic blocs that are drifting apart on the cost of carbon run towards the same climate goal? If emitting is being made cheaper in one jurisdiction and penalised in another, capital moves according to the regulatory price gap rather than the climate target. The result is a problem larger than carbon leakage: the geographic arbitrage of climate policy. Firms can relocate carbon to where it costs less instead of reducing it. The emissions leave the balance sheet, not the atmosphere.

Can Antalya close the finance gap and, at the same time, establish a minimum common direction between carbon regimes travelling in opposite directions?

Where does Türkiye stand?

For Türkiye this is not a theoretical debate. As CBAM expands, the issue stops being one for steel, aluminium, cement and fertiliser producers alone and moves towards the machinery, appliance, automotive and wider manufacturing sectors that use those inputs. Türkiye's largest export market is precisely the bloc travelling this road.

Climate transition is therefore not an environmental preference for Türkiye but part of industrial policy and export strategy. The COP31 Presidency's framing of climate as a question of economic competitiveness matters for that reason: Türkiye's success will be measured not only by emission targets but by how well its industry is prepared for the new trade order.

A new geopolitical border

The world once divided into economic blocs through tariffs, capital flows and energy resources. Carbon regimes now join that list. One bloc tries to grow by deregulating carbon; the other builds its economic space by measuring, pricing and collecting it at the border.

Europe's line is not flawless either. Free allocations, cost-relief measures and endless scope negotiations show the constant bargaining between protecting industry and meeting climate goals. The direction, however, does not change: carbon is becoming a decisive condition for entering the European market.

The gap across the Atlantic is thus not only a divergence of climate policies. It is the emergence of two competing definitions of competitiveness. The US says: fewer rules, cheaper energy. Europe says: less carbon, better protected industry. Antalya, standing between them, promises implementation.

Related concepts

Sources and related research